Public discussion of federal fiscal policy typically focuses on several familiar metrics of performance, including the total deficit, the level of public debt and percentage of federal spending committed to mandatory spending and net interest payments. While useful, these measures are based on accounting conventions developed years ago, and do not capture many of the ways in which the federal government now commits public resources, including obligated budget authority, guarantees associated with various government insurance programs, retirement benefits for federal workers and military personnel, and -most substantiallyfederal social insurance programs such as Social Security and Medicare. Collectively these programs and activities represent substantial and largely overlooked current commitments of future federal resources. After reviewing current measures of fiscal performance, the article presents several alternative ways to quantify federal financial performance over the first half of this decade utilizing more comprehensive measures of mounting federal financial obligations. So, for example, while the commonly reported total deficit of the federal government in FY2005 was $318 billion, a more comprehensive measure of fiscal results over the course of the same year would have shown a deterioration in the country's net financial position in excess of $3.3 trillion -that is, an order of magnitude larger.
To promote more informed debate and encourage more responsible public leadership, the more comprehensive measures of fiscal performance described in this article should be adopted as the primary metrics for reporting the financial performance of the federal government. 4 See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, CBO See Wider Deficit this Year and in 2016 if Tax Cuts Don't End, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2006 , at A4 (reporting $318 billion deficit for FY05 and projected deficit of $360 billion in FY06, which includes the $336 billion deficit reported above plus estimated additional costs for supplemental spending on military activities and flood relief). 5 See Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2002 -2011 (Jan. 2001 ).
-3-released its report, 4 and are the most frequently cited measures of federal budget results.
Occasionally, public attention is also directed to a multi-year aggregation of these annual measures of fiscal performance, as was the case back in January 2001 when the CBO projected $5.0 trillion of cumulative surpluses for FY2001 through FY2010. 5 By way of comparison, the January 2006 CBO report projected aggregate deficits over this same ten-year horizon of $2.5 trillion, roughly $1.1 trillion of actual accumulated deficits for the past five fiscal years, and another $1.3 trillion projected for the next five. If one were to look for a single statistic to explain the recent resurgence of public and political interest in federal budget policy, it would be this precipitous $7.5 trillion swing from a $5 trillion ten-year projected surplus in 2001 to a $2.5 trillion ten-year deficit for the same projection period five years later. TAX NOTES, Feb. 26, 2001 , at 1245.
Projected Actual
-4-A closely related measure of fiscal balance is the amount of federal debt held by the public.
Several years ago, public debt levels gained political salience because of concerns that mounting federal surpluses might force the federal government to redeem substantially all federal debt, thereby eliminating an important financial instrument and perhaps forcing the federal government to invest its excess cash reserves in private capital markets. 6 More recently, concerns have focused on increases in public debt outstanding. Mounting annual deficits mean that the amount of public debt outstanding is on the rise again, a potentially deleterious side-effect of fiscal imbalance.
Although, as explained below, there is not a perfect match between total budget deficits and annual increases in public debt outstanding, the relationship is quite strong. So, for example, the CBO's January 2006 projections indicated that the federal public debt would increase from $4.6 trillion at year-end FY2005 to nearly $6.0 trillion at year-end FY2010, that increase of $1.4 trillion is comparable for the five-year annual deficits projected during that period for the federal government's total budget. In other words, measures of public debt outstanding can be thought of as a cumulative measure of the federal government's total annual deficits and surpluses. For that reason, public debt and changes in public debt are convenient summary measures of fiscal performance, often used in public debate over federal budget policy.
A somewhat more refined measure of federal budget policy deals with the composition of federal spending. As illustrated in Table One, budget experts often distinguish between various categories of federal spending, most typically discretionary spending, mandatory spending, and net interest payments. These divisions sometimes confuse members of the general public, as they do not track more familiar programmatic lines (such as defense spending or public works projects) but they relate to the manner in which Congress authorizes federal outlays and hence have a high degree of salience to budget experts. Typically, what experts stress in discussing current budgetary trends is the declining share of discretionary spending in the federal budget (going from 39.15 percent of total outlays in FY2005 to a projected 34.14 percent in FY2010) as compared with the rising share -5-of mandatory spending (going from a 53.41 percent share in FY2005 to a projected 56.52 percent in FY2010). While this long-term trend was interrupted in the first half of this decade as costs associated with the defense department spending and other Bush Administration priorities expanded discretionary spending, the rise in relative importance of mandatory spending is projected to dominate long-term budget projections, as was emphasized in another recent CBO report. 7 Also occasionally mentioned in discussions of the changing composition of federal spending is the growing significance of net interest payments, projected in the CBO's January 2006 report to rise from 7.44 percent of total outlays in FY2005 to 9.31 percent in FY2010.
So, to recap, the public is implicitly being asked to keep track of three basic issues in thinking about the federal budget. The first two are aggregate measures of fiscal balance: the annual total deficit or surplus -measured annually or over some multi-year time horizon -and the amount of public debt outstanding. The third measure concerns the distribution of total federal outlays, principally the division between discretionary and mandatory spending but also sometimes including net interest payments.
B. Why Do We Care About These Measures of Fiscal Performance?
Suppose, by way of illustration, some well-intentioned member of the general public were confronted with the three measures of performance of fiscal performance mentioned above - Tables One and Two -and then asked why policy makers care so much about these particular numbers. This perfectly reasonable question could be answered in a number of different ways, but I think most experts in the field would stress the measures' values in assessing the past performance of the federal government in fiscal affairs, in predicting a likely result of future performance over the next few years, and finally in identifying the relative ease with which Congress and the President will be able to make fiscal adjustments at least with respect to spending decisions in the near term. In the following subsections, I will expand upon each of these considerations and also say a few words about several complicated and unresolved normative issues that the considerations raise.
Projected Actual

Retrospective Assessment of Past Fiscal Performance
There are a host of reasons why we might care about the relationship between government revenues and outlays as reflected in both total budgetary aggregates (that is total deficits and surpluses) and changes in public debt levels. Within the budgetary context, the most prominent concern is that the costs of excessive deficits and unbridled growth in public debt will have to be borne by taxpayers and other national stakeholders in future years. Experts use deficits and changes in the level of public debt as scorecards for determining how fiscally responsible our political leadership has been on this dimension. A separate justification for focusing on these measures is the impact of deficits and public debt on private capital formation: if the government is borrowing excessively to finance increases in public debt, private borrowers may be crowded out of the market.
Again, measures of recent deficits and changes in debt levels are one useful measure of the federal government's appetite for capital.
Of course, simply noting that deficits and debt levels are useful for identifying excessive burdens on future taxpayers and excessive crowding out of private capital markets does not provide particularly useful guidance as to the normative question of how large deficits or debt levels should be. And within budget policy circles, there is a good deal of confusion and disagreement about this normative issue. Proponents of balanced budget amendments and the targets written into the original Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act implicitly aimed for a deficit target of zero. While one -7-cannot deny the elegance of a balanced budget goal, there are many reasons to suspect that it is a poor policy guidepost in many contexts. In an inflationary environment, a balanced budget implies declining real level debt. It is not entirely clear why the government should always want to reduce the real level of public debt. One might just as easily postulate a constant real level of debt as the a reasonable policy goal, in which case the optimal deficit would be a function of the size of the debt relative to government spending and the rate of inflation. Or one might target a constant level of public debt as a percentage of the GDP, in which case one would also have to factor real GDP growth into one's calculation of optimal deficits.
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A further complication in setting normative criteria for budgetary aggregates or public debt is the manner in which federal resources are deployed and the incidence of their benefits. High deficits and rising federal debt during the Second World War are often cited to illustrate this point.
Because the benefits of these war-time expenditures accrued to future generations in the form of a (relatively) peaceful world, the ordinary rules of fiscal balance were thought not to apply in the first half of the 1940's. While this illustration is compelling, what is less clear is what other kinds of federal expenditures have a similar impact on optimal debt and deficit levels or when the merits of governmental expenditures might counsel for more crowding out of private investment than is usually desirable. Many kinds of government spending might be characterized as investments to benefit future generations -for example, infrastructure projects or expenditures on public education -and it is not clear which are legitimate justifications for deficit financing. Finally, macroeconomic considerations, in the Keynesian sense, also suggest that overall condition of the national economy may have an influence on optimal deficit and debt levels. In brief, deficits and debt levels are important, but the experts are currently hard-pressed to tell us in what precise way they are important or exactly how to tell when they are out of synch with fully theorized criteria.
In the absence of a fully developed theory of deficits and debt, we proceed in a world of 9 See CBO January 2006, supra note 3, at xiii ("At 2.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), this year's [FY2006's] deficit would be slightly larger than the 2.3 percent average recorded since 1965."). 10 See, e.g., Office of Management and Budget, The Nation's Fiscal Outlook (Feb. 2006 with a formula that include current public debt levels, targeted public debt levels, and expected rates of nominal increase in the GDP. This approach assumes that, once public debt reaches the targeted levelsay, thirty percent of GDP -a country can incur deficits at a level that will sustain the public debt as a constant percentage of GDP. As long as there is real economic growth, the real levels of public debt will be increasing. -10-budget policy experts focus on them because these projections convey the consequences of our current fiscal commitments as extrapolated into the future -akin to the vision the Ghost of Christmas Future conveyed to Ebenezer Scrooge. And, just as we care how well government officials have managed fiscal affairs in the immediate past, we are concerned about how our fiscal fate will unfold in the immediate future. If we persist in current policies, how closely will revenue and spending align in future years? To what degree will future spending exceed revenues, thereby deferring additional costs to future years and crowding out private investment through the issuance of public debt? As before, the underlying normative questions of how large projected deficits and public debt level can grow before they become problematic remain obscure, but the notion that the public should be attuned to these projections is universally accepted. And, in the extremes, the appropriate course of action may be clear. A related, but distinct role of future projections is to set a benchmark against which policy changes can be scored. These baseline projections are supposed to represent fiscal results if the federal government leaves its fiscal policies on automatic pilot. The fiscal implications of future governmental actions -that is, deviations from the status quo -are thus evaluated against projections, both in the terms of the direction of a potential change and the magnitude of its effect.
In times of budgetary stringency, political leaders are often assessed on how well they perform in terms of reducing projected deficits. So, for example, congressional leaders might take credit for reconciliation bills that cut medicaid spending as compared with levels included in CBO baseline projections made at the start of the budgeting process.
14 Or, taking a multi-year perspective, critics 15 See, e.g., Office of Management and Budget, supra note 10. projections also serve as a benchmark to assess future legislative reforms, there are countervailing incentives that work in the opposite direction. High projected spending levels make it easier for politicians to find politically advantageous spending cuts, and projections that assume the extension of expiring tax cuts make it easier to get those cuts extended.Their persistence need not reflect majority support, but rather the blocking power of minority interests. Take, for example, the Social Security program, which was initially launched and most recently amended at times in which both houses of Congress had Democratic majorities (the New Deal and 1983). Even if subsequent majorities of both Houses and the President favored Social Security reform, there was no guarantee that reform would occur as minority interests, particularly in the Senate, have considerable power to obstruct reform proposals.
-12-methodologies for budgetary baselines is beyond the scope of this paper. But the fact is that these methodologies have become controversial, and this controversy supports my claim that these projections have assumed a high degree of political salience.
The Capacity to Adjust Spending Decisions and the Risk of Fiscal Ossification
Although budgetary aggregates -whether deficits or surpluses -usually capture the headlines, a persistent subplot in many stories about the federal budget is the changing composition of federal expenditures, most significantly the relentless rise in annual expenditures on entitlement programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. At one level, concern over growth in these items is puzzling as one might have thought that it was a good thing for a society to allocate a greater share of public resources dedicated to the elderly, the infirmed and the impoverished. But, in budgetary circles, the reason these trend lines are identified as problematic is that they are growing faster than the overall economy and also often faster than the growth in federal revenues.
Moreover, the manner in which Congress approves spending for these mandatory programs is quite different than traditional appropriations for other governmental activities. Whereas the traditional process requires both authorizing substantive legislation and annual appropriations, mandatory spending is often (though not always) locked in through permanent appropriations. Rather than requiring annual enactments to continue their funding, mandatory programs often persist in the absence of legislative intervention. 17 So, while the baseline projections of spending over multi-year horizons represent a best guess as to trends in current fiscal commitments, some of those commitments are more difficult to adjust than others.
So, referring back to Table Two, payments imply a default of public debt. Mandatory spending, the vast majority of which is based on social insurance programs, is projected to constitute another 56.5 percent of projected outlays in FY2010. That leaves only 34.1 percent of outlays for discretionary programs, including the defense department and almost all general government functions. By highlighting the changing composition of federal outlays, federal budget experts are calling attention to the fact that nearly two thirds of the federal budget will be on some form of automatic pilot by the end of this decade. Since the net interest portion of this growth can only be addressed through reductions in prior year deficits, the strong implication is that we need to do something to reduce entitlement spending and that our commitments to these programs have become too large for us to afford.
Once again, this framing of our budget choices raises some nice normative questions. Is there a good reason for us to distinguish so sharply in the legislative procedures -really the default rules -for spending on mandatory programs as opposed to discretionary items? Is there something about the constituencies for mandatory programs that warrants procedural safeguards against spending cuts? Do the beneficiaries of these programs have such strong reliance interests that changes in program terms should only be made under extraordinary circumstances and outside of annual appropriation reviews? Or should we perhaps be concerned of the anti-majoritarian implications of putting spending programs on automatic pilot and take actions to resist the special interests that have inserted these spending rules into the federal budget process? Looking over a list of mandatory programs -which include a wide range of social services, retirement and disability benefits for federal workers and military personnel -is it possible to imagine a coherent theory that justifies the budgetary preference for this group of expenditures as opposed to the many other ways in which the federal government allocates its financial resources?
These are large and difficult questions, which I have no intention (or hope) of answering here. My point is simply that an important element of our public debate over budgetary projections is the increasing extent to which net interest payments and mandatory programs threaten to ossify our fiscal future. In the immediate term, this poses the question of whether we should make some Howell E. Jackson, Counting the Ways: The Structure of Federal Spending 18 I might well have added as a fifth aspect, the magnitude of future appropriations specified in authorizing statutes. Authority to appropriate is not the same as an appropriation, and executive branches and agencies cannot obligate funds based solely on authorizing statutes. Authorizing statutes do, however, have some bearing on future spending levels. At a minimum, they set benchmarks for "full funding," about which constituents can complain if the President recommends or Congress appropriates at levels less than those authorized, as for example has happened in public debate over the No-Child-LeftBehind Act. Accordingly, authorizing bills might be understood to set soft baselines for certain programs that may be a good deal higher than those included in most CBO and OMB projections. I do not include authorization levels in my analysis here because the degree of commitment they represent has become relatively limited over time and because a substantial share of discretionary spending is now made without authorizing statutes, notwithstanding the continued existence of House and Senate Rules that formally impose procedural limitations on such appropriations. See Congressional Budget Office Unauthorized Appropriations and Expiring Authorizations (Jan. 2006). See also Mark Champoux & Dan Sullivan, "Authorizations and Appropriations: A Distinction Without Difference?" (May 10, 2006 ) (available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/auth_appro_15.pdf). According, it seems implausible that any reform in budgetary measures would be based on estimates derived from authorized level of appropriations as opposed to actual spending.
-14-substantial downward adjustments in these commitments. Over the longer term, we need to consider whether we shouldn't reduce the number of programs that are permitted to operate under fiscal automatic pilot procedures, thereby reducing what may have become excessively sticky fiscal commitments and resulting reliance interests.
II. A Critique of Existing Measures of Fiscal Performance
Having identified both the principal measures we currently employ to evaluate federal fiscal policy and the functions these measures are supposed to serve, I now consider whether there are important elements of our fiscal life that these measures fail to capture or substantially misrepresent.
To a large degree, I proceed here by argument through laundry list. Ordered loosely by the magnitude of their significance, I describe below four aspects of fiscal policy that are not fully reflected in the budgetary measures we typically employ.
18 Each omitted area bears directly on at least one of the purported functions of our current budgetary measures. Accordingly, their omission potentially compromises the integrity of public debate over federal fiscal policy. For the most part, these omitted areas can be quantified, and, to the extent practical, I include estimates of their significance and growth over the first half of this decade. I conclude with a presentation of the REV. 365, 404 (2003) . 20 See Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. A. § 1341 (2006) . This criminal sanction is distinct from but serves to safeguard the requirements of U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 7, that funds not be withdrawn from the Treasury without appropriation by Congress.
-15-aggregate effects of these omitted areas on fiscal performance over the past half decade.
While the selection of areas presented in this analysis may seem a touch random, there is a common theme. Consider for a moment a lobbyist in Washington whose task is to gain access to federal resources for a client. Assume further that the budgetary measures discussed in the preceding section are binding in the sense that they are more difficult for politicians to satisfy the lobbyist's needs with the immediate outlays of cash, which would increase the reported deficit and levels of public debt. How might a lobbyist advance his or her client's interests under these conditions? What follows, in essence, is a list of suggestions. All arguably can advance the interests of the lobbyist's client and none is fully picked up by the budgetary measures upon which we traditionally rely. But gains for the lobbyist's client also constitute burdens for the federal government and future generations. So budgetary measures that fail to reflect obligations arising out of these strategies may understate the growth of fiscal burdens -both historically] and prospectively -and may also disguise the extent of fiscal ossification. The exclusion of these strategies from budgetary aggregates also means that they do not factor into the baseline for budgetary reform.
A. Trends in Unexpended Budgetary Authority
It is often remarked that the federal budgetary process is based on obligation authority. -16-discussed so far in this paper concern budget authority. Rather they depend (for the most part) on "outlays," that is the amount of cash payments made from the U.S. Treasury during the course of the fiscal year. For programs that depend on annual budget authority, outlays are apt to approximate budget authority. But for programs with multi-year budget authority, this equivalence will not hold true. 21 And, herein, lies potential mischief.
Without having any impact on current year deficits, a lobbyist can lock in future spending for clients by obtaining multi-year budget authority. And, if one refers to authority and even has some capacity to back out of obligated authority (potentially subject to contractual damage awards), the presence of large and growing outstanding budgetary authority balances at fiscal year ends indicates that our fiscal hands are even more bound that traditional presentations suggest. Moreover, this ossification extends to discretionary spending, not just mandatory spending. -18-Another important area in which past congressional actions has committed the government to future expenditures is in the area of loans and guarantees. Here, however, the commitments are partially reflected in the budgetary aggregates. As a result of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, the federal budget recognizes the subsidy cost of direct loans and loan guarantees in the year in which the loan is made or the guarantee extended.
B. Loans And Guarantees
23 Table Four, accounting convention means that when the federal government makes a direct loan or extends a loan guarantee, the projected "subsidy" cost of that transaction must be reflected in the federal budget that year. So, the $14 billion of subsidy costs for FY2005 reported in Table Four factored into the year's $318 billion total deficit. This aspect of these financial arrangements is reflected in 24 It may also be the case that annual implicit interest costs of subsidized direct loans and direct guarantees are not reported in budgetary aggregates. These subsidies are recognized in the federal budget on a discounted basis, which means that they grow in size until recognized. This implicit interest should, in theory, be recognized on an annual basis, but may not be under current practices.
-19-total budget deficits and surpluses.
But the liabilities associated with federal guarantees are not fully incorporated into all of our budgetary aggregates. Although the cost of subsidies is reflected in annual deficit totals, the liabilities that these deficits generate are not considered part of the public debt of the United States.
At least as far as commonly cited cumulative budgetary aggregates are concerned, these loan liabilities are effectively off-balance sheet liabilities. Thus, the $48 billion of loan guarantees outstanding at year-end FY2005 (see Table Four ) do not figure into the public debt numbers reported in Table One and prominently factored into public debates about public debt burdens as a percentage of GDP.
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To be sure, the magnitude of our loan guarantee liabilities is quite small in comparison to our public debt levels ($48 billion versus $4.5 trillion at year-end FY2005) and so one might well dismiss this omission as non-material. But the general point that the federal government might be incurring financial liabilities that are functionally similar to explicit public debt but not included in public debates over fiscal policies is important. And, as we will see shortly, the magnitude of other omissions is often highly material. Moreover, in most other contexts, the recognition of the liability does not factor into annual deficit totals at the time the commitment is made. Rather, the liabilities factor into budgetary aggregates only when they are liquidated, well after there is any realistic opportunity to reduce their magnitude and without ever having been subject to the kind of public scrutiny and consent associated with traditional annual appropriations.
C. Other Accrual Measures Not Reflected in Current Budgetary Aggregates
Many different kinds of federal financial activities share the same basic structure as loan guarantees: the commitment of financial obligations now -often associated with the receipt of a premium-like-payment or service -with the expectation, often contractual, that the government will 
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation
As can be gleaned from any number of recent press accounts, the financial condition of the PBGC has been deteriorating over the past few years. Table Five extracts -21-Reports of the U.S. Government, which has increased its estimate of the corporation's recognized liabilities from $14 billion to $70 billion since FY2001. Indeed, if one digs into the footnotes of these reports, one finds there are even larger levels of possible losses (from companies such as GM that may attempt to terminate underfunded pension plans in the next few years and pass on substantial additional losses to the PBGC). Most experts agree that the PBGC will incur substantial additional losses over the next few years, with long term losses likely to push the corporation's net position in the range of negative $50 billion to $100 billion over the next five years.
In contrast to the grim economic reality of the PBGC's financial condition, federal budgetary aggregates factor in only the PBGC's current revenues and outlays. In an Orwellian reversal, this difference means that the financial operations of PBGC actually have made a positive contribution to the federal budget (reducing deficits) over the past five years, because cash inflows from PBGC premiums and other sources have actually exceeded its outlays. Morever, in the President's FY2007 budget proposal (as well as recently enacted reconciliation legislation), increased PBGC premiums are projected to generate more budgetary savings over the next few years, even though it is highly -23-
Military Personnel, Civil Government Employee and Veteran Benefits
An even more substantial set of federal obligations relate to benefits owed to military employees, veterans, and civilian employees.
26 Some of these costs are reflected in the federal budget as outlays, but a substantial amount of accruals (including implicit interest on past accruals)
is not included in federal budgetary aggregates. Table Six summarizes 
Net Position of the United States
With time and effort, one could work through every element of the Financial Statements of the U.S. Government and consider the extent to which the component elements are omitted from traditional budgetary aggregates. In highlighting the financial results of the PBGC and federal benefit programs, I have chosen areas which strike me as particularly problematic omissions from federal budgetary aggregates. Each area is functionally similar to the loan guarantees. Each year the government receives a benefit (analogous to a loan guarantee premium and the gratitude of a constituent who received credit support) in exchange for an obligation to expend resources in the future. In the case of PBGC, actual premiums are taken in today in exchange for a financial commitment to support failed private pension programs in the future. With benefit programs, the government receives today the services with employees and military personnel who accept reduced current wages and in exchange commits to benefit payments in the future. Total deficit measures that omit these obligations while recognizing the benefits of PBGC premium receipts and lower wages misrepresent the burdens imposed on future taxpayers from current governmental activities.
Similarly, public debt measures that omit the implicit liabilities of these programs understate the cumulative burdens of past governmental operations. Table Seven , which summarizes the key statistics from the accrual-based Financial Reports of the United States for the last five years. Emphasized here are net operating losses (analogous to but much larger than our total budget deficits) and the net position of the United States (similarly in spirit to, but broader and larger than our public debt). The quite substantial differences between these two reporting approaches raise, in my view, some fundamental question about the accuracy and completeness of our current budgetary measures. 31 In this presentation, following FASAB guidelines, no offset is included for trust fund balances. The measures of closed group liability included in Social Security Administration documents typically do include such offsets, because their focus is the trust funds as separate entities. As this paper -and FASAB requirements more generally -present a consolidated government perspective, trust fund offsets are inappropriate. Table Eight is striking. The closed group liability of the Social Security system alone is more than three times the public debt, and has been growing by more than $500 billion a year since the beginning of the decade, with most of the growth coming from increases in commitments to working-age Americans, those between 15 and 61. Annual increases of "legacy debt" of Social Security have therefore been a good deal larger than annual increases in our public debt. Yet, the accrual of liabilities in the Social Security system is wholly absent from our traditional federal budgetary aggregates.
The annual growth in unfunded liabilities of Medicare over the past five years has also been To make these projections, I assumed that Medicare would continue to receive the same ratio of general revenues to dedicated payroll tax contributions for Part B and D in the future as it did in the most current fiscal year. This methodology generates a substantially smaller adjusted closed group liability for Medicare than does the projection method favored by Gokhale and Smetters, who assume no general revenue contributions for future Medicare benefits. 
E. An Alternative Perspective on Budgetary Aggregates and Trends
As a final exercise, I present in Table Nine an -32-Not only does this alternative presentation call into question the validity of our traditional measures of annual deficits and public debt, the presentation also suggests that the ossification in our spending latitude is even greater than currently understood. Once one recognizes the extent of our overall financial obligations, the implicit interest payments on these obligations also become clear. The obligations presented in Table Nine are largely based on present value estimates of future payments. Thus, with each passing year, these obligations increase, reflecting an implicit interest charge on these obligations. While traditional budgetary projections of the sort reflected in Table   Two show annual net interest payments for the last years of this decade running in the range of $200 to $300 billion, the total interest costs for the federal government (explicit and implicit) must be on the order of ten times higher -that is, over a trillion dollars a year. This hidden interest charge is the critical fact of our country's fiscal condition, but it is wholly absent from our public debate over fiscal matters. 
III. Implications, Extensions and Further Lines of Research
In the main, the foregoing analysis has been limited to an extended critique of a current approach to budgetary aggregates as inadequate to fulfill the purposes for which they are designed:
providing meaningful summary information about past financial performance and future trends in the nation's fiscal matters. My argument is that there are a host of ways in which financial claims are perfected against the United States -that is, the fiscal burden imposed. Or rather than increase the current wages of federal employees, the legislature might enrich their benefits, the cost of which does not need to be recognized in future years. In many contexts, there will be plausible off-balance sheet substitutes
Box One
Is Accounting Irrelevant?
Whenever one challenges the inadequacy of accounting measures, as I do throughout this essay, a possible objection is that accounting treatments do not matter, as long as the underlying facts are publicly available. As all of the information presented in this essay is drawn from government documents, one might therefore argue that the public (and the economic profession) is already aware of this information. So any change in budgetary aggregates would have not impact on either political outcomes or economic guidance. Perhaps, but I am skeptical. There is some empirical evidence that accounting treatments to affect political outcomes, at least in the context of off budget treatment of social insurance programs. Sita Nataraj & John B. Shoven, Has the Unified Budget Undermined the Government Trust Funds?, NBER Working Paper W10953 (Dec. 2004) . Moreover, in the context of state budgeting, it appears that recent reforms requiring the current recognition of accrued benefit costs is having an impact on the willingness of state legislature to continuing offering these benefits at the same level in the past. See Stanley C.Wisniewski, Potential State Government Practices Impact of the New GASB Accounting Standard for Retiree Health Benefits, 25 PUBLIC BUDGETING & FIN. 104 (Mar. 2005) . Still, one must acknowledge that this is a point of uncertainty. If accounting measures do not matter, than the force of my argument is much diminished. 36 A major reason why the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 was enacted was to prevent Congress from substituting what appears to be costless guarantees for what appeared to be excessively expensive loans. So my hypothesis regarding spending substitution has some historical basis. See also CBO Comparison, supra note 2, at 8 (noting advantages of accrual accounting over traditional budget measures in managing federal programs). Other predictions included in the text are speculative, but might be subject to empirical validation or disproof. 37 The federal process is replete with other illustrations of privileged spending and constrained competition for budgetary resources. As discussed earlier, important procedural differences advantage most forms of mandatory spending as compared with discretionary spending. When Congress sets separate multi-year discretionary caps for defense programs and non-defense programs, constituents funded in one area do not have to compete with those funded in other areas. A possible limitation to this proposition exists when government action constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property or a violation of the Contract Clause. Arguably, such an action gives rise to legal liability for the federal government, but there remains uncertainty over whether government might avoid payment on even these claims by failing to appropriate funds. For an introduction to some of the difficult issues these questions raise, see John Harrison, "New Property, Entrenchment, and the Fiscal Constitution," in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY, supra note 8. Another legalistic way of approaching financial obligations is to distinguish between those obligations which Congress could rescind by legislative Act from other obligations. This distinction is usually made with respect to Social Security where the statute specifies and the Supreme Court has confirmed that Congress is free to change benefit formulas at any time. Some argue that at least with respect to social insurance programs, the fact that Congress could amend benefits provides a complete justification for not recognizing the liabilities that current statutory obligations represent.
From a law professor's perspective, this distinction is not as sharp as it might initially appear to others. Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the U.S. government is constitutionally empowered to avoid any legal obligations, even, in theory, explicit public debt but also guarantees, contracts, and most other financial obligations. Private parties can proceed against the federal government on these and other claims only because Congress has chosen to waive sovereign immunity in a variety of contexts. But the government could withdraw that waiver. 38 Of course the February 14, 2007
39 Among public law scholars, there is apparently some debate over the meaning of sovereign immunity: whether the doctrine authorize the government to escape legal liability or whether the doctrine merely permits the government to evade enforcement of private legal rights. For my purposes, these disagreements are metaphysical niceties, which do not bear on my functional claim that the government has wide latitude to avoid financial obligations when the political will exists.
-37-government doesn't -at least, the U.S. Government hasn't for the last two hundred years -but that is because the political and economic costs of waiver are thought to be prohibitive. But, similar reasons explain why Congress does not lightly exercise its power to alter Social Security benefits.
Social Security, like public debt and like all other governmental obligations, are binding not for purely legal reasons, but for political ones. In all cases, the government has the "legal" option of adjusting statutory entitlements or exerting sovereign immunity, but it just doesn't choose to do so.
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So if legal rules will not provide the way, how should we determine which financial commitments should be incorporated into out basic financial aggregates? An alternative approach is to look to the accounting discipline and seek to identify those obligations (1) that arise out of past transactions and (2) that give rise to probable future economic sacrifice -in other words, a functional, probabilistic approach that considers both the likelihood of future expenditures and the context in which those obligations arose. Working quickly through some of the areas canvassed in this paper, this approach would point in the following directions:
Outstanding Budgetary Authority at Fiscal Year-End: Though outstanding budgetary authority does give rise to future economic sacrifice, in most cases past transactions will not yet have occurred, even with obligated resources so perhaps this authority should not be recognized unless some substantial amount of service has been provided or goods delivered. However, prominent disclosure -akin to footnotes in corporate financial statements -would be appropriate for these latent liabilities and it might make sense to specify in budgetary projections what share of projected discretionary spending is already "locked in" by advanced appropriations.
Loan Guarantees: These obligations satisfy the accounting definition of liabilities, entailing both past transactions and future economic sacrifice, and should be included in measures of cumulative financial burdens as well as annual changes in those burdens.
Howell E. Jackson, Counting the Ways: The Structure of Federal Spending 40 See supra note 25. Even if one accepts that these GSE's are supported by an implicit federal guarantee, the task of recognizing such liabilities in accounting terms is complex because the scope of the potential liability is large but the probability of payment being required is low. Accounting for other lowprobability, high-impact events -such as nuclear accidents or extreme natural disasters -present similar difficulties.
-38-PBGC Financial Obligations: Like loan guarantees, past transactions have occurred in the receipt of premium payments and the extension of insurance coverage. The probable future economic sacrifice dimension is more difficult because of the absence of full faith and credit support for the PBGC. Some evaluation of probability is called for in such contexts, and one could look both to past precedent -like the savings and loan bail out -and current expectations to draw a conclusion here. The FASAB requirements underlying the Financial Statements of the U.S. -39-statements reporting projected benefit levels. 41 In some respects, the Medicare program is similar in that the receipt of benefits is tied to labor force participation and payroll taxes, albeit much more loosely than is the case with Social Security. The benefit levels are, however, not as well specified as Social Security, and have been changed on numerous occasions in the past. While the scale of Medicare program commitments is staggering, quantifying their probable economic impact is more difficult. 42 Finally, there are a host of other mandatory spending programs. The range of programs is so broad that it is difficult to make categorical statements, but for the most part eligibility for other benefits depends not on past service or the payment of earmarked fees; rather eligibility depends on current status when the benefits are received. Thus the future economic sacrifice of these programs does not generally arise out of past work experience in the same way the Social Security and Medicare benefits do. Thus, one could quite easily imagine a system of budgetary aggregates that quantifies the future costs of Social Security and Medicare but not the costs of most other mandatory spending items.
Discretionary Spending: Finally, one might ask whether budgetary aggregates should quantify future economic sacrifices projected for various forms of discretionary spending. This point is typically made in the form of a rhetorical challenge: "Why not calculate the cost of future federal spending on education or transportation if you are going to make those calculations for Social Security?" The answer here is, I think, two fold. First, like some forms of mandatory spending, most discretionary spending does not arise out of past transactions. Rather, future discretionary spending is based on future status and transactions. A second justification for distinguishing between discretionary spending and some social insurance programs is the fact that our levels of discretionary spending do fluctuate a good deal more over time than do our levels of annual outlays for major social insurance programs such as Social Security and Medicare. -40-the future economic sacrifice for discretionary programs is not nearly as probable as that of social insurance programs. If one plots federal spending as a percentage of GDP over long periods of time, there is considerably more variation in categories of spending that are subject to annual discretionary allocations as compared to those that are funded through more permanent mandatory spending.
Education spending, dependent as it is on annual appropriations and continuous political support, varies considerably over time. The growth in Medicare spending as a percentage of GDP, in contrast, has been consistent and persistent. More generally, if one compares annual fluctuations in all major areas of government expenditures, the two major social insurance programs -Social Security and Medicare -stand apart from all other functions in claiming either stable or increasing shares of federal spending over multiple decades.
Finally, let me conclude with a word about potential connections between accounting reform and substantive reform of underlying social insurance programs. Among budget policy makers, much has been written about long-term fiscal imbalance, focusing particularly on entitlement spending. Most experts agree -and I certainly do not dispute -that any sensible solution to our long-term fiscal problems depends on addressing (read reducing) entitlements to some degree.
Against this background, one might plausibly object to any accounting reform that would recognize social insurance spending as an existing obligation of the federal government. This objection to the expansion of budgetary aggregates proceeds not on theoretical grounds but simply out of a pragmatic fear that recognizing these liabilities will make it more difficult to adjust them downward. 43 While I am not entirely unsympathetic to this line of argument, I also think there are two important countervailing considerations. First, the current recognition of unfunded social insurance costs is apt to focus political attention on the present magnitude of these obligations in a way that long term projections focusing on budgetary imbalances two, three or even four decades in the future cannot. Second, by including the continuing accretion in these obligations over the next five or ten year horizon, my proposed approach would give Congress and the President a short term -41-target against which they can measure success. 44 So, for example, political leaders might aspire to cut the ratio of financial burden to GDP from 281 percent at year-end 2005 to 200 percent by yearend 2010. 45 It is conceivable that this target could be met with only modest reductions in outlays for social insurance over the next five years. For a combination of these and related reasons, I think that it is plausible that the recognition certain off-balance sheet obligations that are not currently reflected in current budgetary aggregates or even the current Financial Reports of the U.S.
Government might actually improve the prospects for meaningful entitlement reform in the next few years, rather than having the opposite effect.
Conclusion
The measures of federal fiscal performance that dominate public debate over budgetary policy are substantially incomplete and omit the financial impact of many governmental activities.
Broader measures of financial performance are, however, available and could be used as a basis for more complete presentations of the financial postures of the federal government. Were these new measures to become the basis of public discourse of federal fiscal policy, the benefits could be substantial, both in terms of improving federal spending decisions and clarifying the fiscal challenges that this country faces.
